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The point of this paper is to show that under a certain set of highly plausible
circumstances, the well-known fiscal equalisation transfer required to establish spa-
tial efficiency in federations, regional unions of states (such as the EU) or unitary
countries with local governments, induces under-taxation of economic rents. The
circumstances which lead to this result are carefully explained in the paper. It is
also noted that the result does not invalidate the standard spatial efficiency case
for inter-regional transfers. Rather, it means that whether such transfers are wel-
fare enhancing in net terms depends on the benefit from achieving spatial efficiency
relative to the cost arising from the under-taxation of rent.
Key Words: federalism, intergovernmental relations, inter-governmental differen-
tials and their effects, federal state relations.
JEL: H73, H77.
1 Introduction
The fiscal federalism literature shows us that spatial efficiency in federations, unitary
nations with local governments or regional unions of semi-independent nation states,
may require an inter-regional equalization transfer to correct for fiscal and economic
rent externalities arising from population mobility. This is known as the efficiency-in-
migration efficiency case for equalization. A full survey of the relevant literature is beyond
the scope of this paper. An excellent overview discussion is provided in Boadway (2004).
To achieve spatial efficiency, the equalization transfer must redistribute income from
regions that generate relatively large rents in favour of low rent regions. Region-specific
economic rents can arise from the presence of fixed factors such as natural resources or
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land. The efficient transfer must also redistribute income from regions with relatively
small fiscal externalities in favour of those with comparatively large fiscal externalities.
There is a well-known expression for the optimal transfer which captures these external-
ities formally. Absent equalization, free migration equilibria in this world are inefficient.
Economic rents generated by fixed factors affect migration decisions and the equaliza-
tion transfer only if they are captured (socialized) by regional governments through their
budget and disbursed to residents as higher spending on services and/or lower taxes. If
they are not socialized and remain as private income, or get capitalized, rents have no
effect on the efficiency of migration equilibria. In this case, the efficiency-in-migration
case for equalization depends on fiscal externalities. Hence, the local capture and dis-
bursement of rents on the basis of residency is a critical part of the efficiency-in-migration
case for inter-regional equalization transfers.
The theory has abstracted from the precise mechanism through which rents are so-
cialized. This has helped researchers to focus on other important and interesting issues.
Nevertheless, it does imply that the theory is incomplete in the sense that it has not
considering inter-regional transfers in a context where regions also choose rent capture
effort as a voluntary choice based on optimizing behavior.
A question this raises is whether we can learn anything new about the efficiency-
in-migration case for equalization if the extent of rent capture by regions is a decision
variable, such as a rent tax?
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formal answer to this question. It does so
by developing a fairly standard policy game for an economy with regions. These regions
can be thought of as states or provinces in a federation, semi-independent nation-states
within a regional union (such as the EU) or local governments in a unitary country.
The provision of local public goods is assumed to be a regional decision variable, a
central authority chooses an equalization transfer designed to correct for fiscal and rent
externalities and regions pre-commit to their policies as first movers. As is carefully
explained in the paper, this set up corresponds to the assignment of decision variables
and timing frequently observed in practice and is studied in the literature. It is, therefore,
an important case to consider. A point of departure in this paper is that regions can also
tax rent generated from a fixed factor, the revenue from which is redistributed on the
basis of residency. Regions choose the tax to maximize their own self interest.
From the equilibrium conditions for this model, it is shown that the presence of a
central equalization scheme designed to achieve spatial efficiency causes regions to under-
tax economic rents. What is more, there is the distinct possibility that regions will choose
to leave all local rents as private income; that is, rent tax rates in equilibrium are equal
to zero. Thus, while the equalization transfer still ensures that equilibria are spatially
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efficient, at least under the assumptions about timing and assignment made in this paper,
it does so at the cost of causing under-taxation of economic rents with a consequent loss
of national social welfare (since positive taxes on rent are shown to be welfare enhancing).
Thus, allowing rent capture to be a decision variable for regions who pursue their own
self-interest tells us something substantially new about the efficiency-in-migration case for
inter-regional transfers. It has been thought such transfers were unambiguously welfare
enhancing. Once rent capture is endogenous, this is no longer necessarily so clear cut,
at least for the assignment and timing considered in this paper. When rent taxation is a
voluntary regional choice, in order to find out whether equalization that corrects for fiscal
and rent externalities is unambiguously welfare enhancing, we really need to consider how
the social welfare costs of rent under-taxation offset the social welfare gain from achieving
spatial efficiency. In other words, once the induced side effects of rent under-taxation are
recognized, one should be interested in the net welfare effect of transfers designed to
establish spatial efficiency.
Hence, the paper identifies a plausible set of circumstances which lead us to modify
our thinking on the efficiency-in-migration case for inter-regional equalization transfers.
The paper structure is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model of a decentralized
economy where rent capture is an optimizing decision. This model is employed throughout
the paper. As a benchmark, Section 3 then solves a social planner problem for this
economy to find the conditions that must be satisfied for efficiency (including a description
of the optimal rent taxes). In Section 4, a three stage policy game is developed where
regions choose rent taxes as anticipatory first movers while an inter-regional transfer is
chosen by a central authority. Interpretation and discussion of extensions is provided in
Section 5 while conclusions are in Section 6.
2 Model
Consider a regional economy with two regions indexed by i = 1, 2. The economy could be
a federation, regional union of semi-independent nation states, or a unitary country with
local jurisdictions. There is a given population, N, of imperfectly mobile citizens each
endowed with a unit of labor which they supply within their region of residence. Hence,
from now on N is also the national labor supply. Setting this equal to one for convenience,
the total labor supply is n1 + n2 = 1 where n1 and n2 are the regional supplies of labor.
Given that labor is mobile, from the perspective of regions labor supply is a variable
input. Region i also has a fixed factor, Ti which is thought of as a natural resource owned
by the residents of region i. Regions can have different endowments of the fixed factor.
Each region uses the variable labor and fixed input to produce a numeraire, fi(ni, Ti),
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where fi(ni, Ti) is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave on R+n and
fi(0, 0) = 0. Assuming the numeraire has a price of one, fi(ni, Ti) is also the value of
output in region i. Since Ti is fixed, output of the numeraire is expressed as fi(ni) from




i = 1, 2. (2.1)




Region i has a large and fixed number, ji = 1, ...., Ji, of identical firms who each
produce an equal per firm share, fi(ni)
Ji
, of the region’s numeraire. Once firms have paid
labor its wage, on the assumption that Ti has no market price, the region’s economic
rent,
πi = fi(ni)− wini i = 1, 2, (2.2)
accrues to the firms of region i as super-normal profits. Since firms in region i are identical
they each earn the same share of this profit, πi
Ji
.
At this point, the most general approach would be to allow firms in region i to be
owned by residents of region i and j (i 6= j) and foreigners. This can be done by assuming
given ownership shares using parameters. An advantage of this option is that it allows
for an initial allocation of rents as private income across the two regions and between
the economy and foreign shareholders. However, this makes the modeling of the optimal
rent tax levied by a region, to be examined below, more complex in the sense that it
introduces cross border rent tax externalities. To abstract from these complexities, the
simplifying assumption is made here that all firms in the economy are foreign-owned and
hence that rents or profits accrue in the first instance to foreign shareholders.
Region i also has a government which levies a source-based tax, ti, where 0 6 ti 6 1,
on economic rent in region i. As will be shown, the tax choice is made as part of an
optimizing decision. Revenue collected from the tax is tiπi and the net profit accruing
to foreign shareholders is (1 − ti)πi. Once captured, rent in region i is recycled to local
residents as an equal per capita lump sum transfer through the regional budget. Thus,
through a combination of a rent tax and revenue recycling, private rent is turned into
income which is then collectively owned by the locals of region i.
If ti = 0, there is no local rent capture effort. Alternatively, if ti = 1 the rent in region
i is fully appropriated by regional governments. A tax rate between zero and one implies
that regions socialize some of their rents and let a portion flow offshore as foreign profit
income.
Since the fixed factor has no market price the rent tax can also be interpreted as an
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attempt by region i to provide a rental rate or shadow price, tiπi
Ti
, for each unit of the
fixed input used by firms. The regional government, rather than the market, sets the
price for the fixed factor by way of its rent tax policy.1
With this set up, total labor income in region i consists of wage income, wini, together
with revenue raised from the rent tax, tiπi, which is recycled to them on an equal per
capita lump sum basis.2 Hence, total labor income is defined as wini + tiπi. Within each
region, wini+tiπi
ni
is per capita labor income. Mobile labor is assumed to have identical
quasi-linear preferences. The analysis can, therefore, proceed in terms of a representative
citizen who has a continuous utility function which is linear in xi, a pure private good,
and strictly concave in gi, a local public good benefit, as follows,
ui = xi + vi(gi) i = 1, 2, (2.3)
where vi(gi) is the sub-utility function for gi. For simplicity, private and local public good
prices are assumed to be given and equal to one.





i = 1, 2, (2.4)
where α is a congestion parameter assumed to be the same across regions. If α = 0, then




region i provides a pure private good. For alpha between zero and one the public good is
mixed.
Mobility with attachment to place, as in Mansoorian and Myers (1993), implies the
following migration constraint must also be satisfied,
x1 + v1(g1) + a(1− n1) = x2 + v2(g2) + an2, (2.5)
where 0 6 a 6 1 is the attachment parameter. Noting from (2.4) that Gi = nαi gi is total
spending on the local public good in region i the budget constraint for region i is
xini + n
α
i gi = wini + tiπi i = 1, 2. (2.6)
This completes the set up of the basic model. Its salient points are as follows. A given
1In practice, regional governments use a number of taxes to extract super-normal profit or rent
from firms involved in the extraction of fixed factors such as natural resources. Such taxes include user
fees/charges, licenses and royalties based on the value of production. The rent tax, ti, in this model can
be seen as a simple proxy for these taxes.





number of citizens migrate imperfectly between two regions. Together with a region-
specific fixed factor (natural resources), mobile labor is used in each region to produce
a numeraire which is converted into a private and congested local public good. Labor
is paid its wage (marginal product) but the fixed input has no market price to firms.
Economic rent generated from its use initially accrues to foreigners as private income
but can be captured by regional governments through a rent tax. The quantum of rent
harvested is the result of an optimizing decision by regions, explained below. The rent
tax can also be seen as regions providing a rental price for the fixed natural resource
input. Revenue from the tax is recycled to residents of region i lump sum, and equal per
capita.
3 Social welfare optimum
The objective of this section is to define the conditions that must be satisfied in the
economy described above for a social welfare optimum. These conditions are then used as
a benchmark to assess the efficiency of decentralized outcomes where regions choose rent
taxes in the presence of inter-regional equalization transfers. The social welfare optimum
is characterized in the standard way by solving the problem of a mythical central planner
who chooses xi, gi, ti and n1 to maximize the social welfare function,
W = δu1 + (1− δ)u2, (3.1)
subject to the following migration and aggregate feasibility constraints,
(i) x1 + v1(g1) + a(1− n1) = x2 + v2(g2) + an2
(ii) n1x1 + (1− n1)x2 + nα1 g1 + (1− n1)αg2 = w1n1 + t1π1 + w2(1− n1) + t2π2,
where n2 = 1 − n1 is used in the aggregate feasibility constraint, (ii), and n2 = 1 − n1
is used in π2. The parameter 0 6 δ 6 1 is the weight allocated to region 1 in the social
welfare function and (1− δ) is the weight for region 2.
The first order necessary conditions are,
(x1) : δ + λ1 − λ2n1 = 0
(g1) : (δ + λ1)v1,g1 − λ2nα1 = 0
(x2) : 1− δ + λ1 − λ2n2 = 0
(g2) : (1− δ + λ1)v2,g2 − λ2nα2 = 0
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(n1) : −2aλ1 + λ2(µ1 − µ2) = 0
(t1) : π1 = 0
(t2) : π2 = 0, (3.2)
where the variables in brackets preceding each expression represent the decision variable
being optimized. Note that
µ1 =
{


















which appear in the first order condition for n1, are the social marginal benefits of an





ni i = 1, 2 (3.4)
is the change in aggregate rent income in region i as a migrant enters the region. With




ni > 0 and total rent in region i is
increasing in labor supply.
Combining the first order conditions for x1, g1, x2 and g2 yields,
n1−αi vi,gi = 1 i = 1, 2. (3.5)
We can see from this that optimality requires local public goods to be provided according
to the usual Samuelson efficiency rule. This is not new and is not discussed further.
Solving for λ1 and λ2 from the first order conditions for x1 and x2, and using the
solutions in the first order condition for n1 while allowing δ to vary from 0 to 1, the first
order necessary condition for n1 can be expressed as
−2an2 6 (µ1 − µ2) 6 2an1. (3.6)
This is analogous to the standard condition for spatial efficiency [see expressions (16) and
(17) in Mansoorian and Myers (1993), equation (7) in Wellisch (1994) or expression (26)
in Caplan et al. (2000)]. It too is not explained further.
Now consider the first order condition for t1 from (3.2). π1 is the marginal benefit
to region 1 residents from an increase in t1. Optimality requires the planner to choose
t1 so that this marginal benefit is equal to zero. Given that initially rents accrue to
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foreigners by assumption, the burden of the tax is borne only by them. The welfare of
foreigners does not enter into the planner’s social welfare function so she increases the
tax until marginal benefit is driven to zero (there is no marginal cost). An analogous
interpretation applies to the first order necessary condition for t2. Namely, the planner
increases t2 until the marginal benefit in terms of additional rent revenue is zero.
3 Thus,
the rent tax first order conditions imply that t1 = t2 = 1 and locally generated economic
rent is fully captured for the benefit of locals.4
This result is consistent with proposition 1, page 237, of Wildasin and Wilson (1998)
who also find it optimal for a region to levy a 100 percent tax on rents from a fixed factor
(land in their model) which would otherwise accrue to foreigners. It is an example of tax
exporting: the burden of the tax is fully borne by shareholders who do not appear in the
planner’s social welfare function. With this initial assignment of rent income, the tax has
no marginal cost from the perspective of a social planner.
This completes the discussion of a social optimum. The key points are as follows. A
welfare optimum requires efficient public good provision and spatial efficiency - as is well-
known - and also that all economic rent is captured and recycled to locals. A confiscatory
rent tax also provides a shadow price for the underlying fixed factor, natural resources.
Full rent capture is optimal here because all rents accrue to foreigners, by assumption,
and the social planner does not care about their well-being in her social welfare function.
4 Regional policy game
Let us now consider a three stage policy game in which regions choose rent taxes and
local public good provision as first movers. An inter-regional equalisation transfer which
corrects for fiscal and rent externalities arising from migration is chosen in a second stage
by a central authority for given regional policies. Labor makes its location choice last
based on what it observes regional and central policies to be. It is assumed regions
anticipate the induced migration and transfer effects of their policies and the central
authority takes regional policies as given while anticipating the induced effects of its
policies on labor location choices.
Why focus on this assignment of decision variables and order of moves? Assigning
3The total effect on regional rent of a change in the rent tax, t1, is actually
∂π1
∂t1






However, from (2.2) rent in region 1 is a function of the region’s labor supply and in the planner problem
labor supply is a choice variable. Hence, when the planner chooses t1 it does so for a given n1 implying
that ∂n1∂t1 = 0. This is why the change in rent for region 1 as the planner increases t1 is just π1. This is
in contrast to the policy game considered below where t1 is a choice variable. There, n1 is a function of
joint local and central policies, including t1. One must then take account of the impact of a change in






4When ti = 1, the planner ensures a rental rate of
πi
Ti
is charged for the fixed input.
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the transfer centrally corresponds with the practice of equalisation world-wide where
inter-regional transfers are usually implemented by a national treasury or other central
institution. For example, in Australia an independent federal commission implements
equalisation between states. The equalization transfer in any given year is also commonly
based on historical regional spending and tax data. In the Australian case, the transfer
in any particular year is derived from a moving average of state spending and tax data
for the previous three years.5 This provides Australian states with the opportunity to act
pre-emptively and distort policies to influence their transfer (see Petchey (2009)). It is
also the case that in many economies regions levy taxes designed to capture supernormal
profits or rents obtained by firms from fixed factors, and that there are no constitutional
or other restrictions to stop regions from taxing rents. So regional assignment of rent
taxes is also plausible and a reflection of the reality of tax assignment.
Perhaps this is also why this assignment and timing of moves has been considered
formally in the fiscal federalism literature (though not specifically the assignment of
rent taxes locally). Some notable papers here include Caplan et al. (2000), Boadway
et al. (2003) and Boadway and Tremblay (2010). Drawing on the industrial organisation
literature, Caplan et al. (2000) think of this in terms of regions as Stackleberg leaders.
To be more specific, suppose regions choose ti and gi, for i = 1, 2, to maximize region-
specific social welfare. A central authority chooses a self-financing lump sum transfer, ρ,
which it makes from region 1 to 2, in order to maximize national social welfare. When
ρ > 0, the transfer redistributes income from region 1 to 2 and if ρ < 0 the opposite
applies; the transfer takes income from region 2 and gives it to region 1. Mobile labor
makes its location choices in the final stage for given regional and central policies. In
stage 1, regions also anticipate the labor location and equalization transfer responses
to their policy choices. Similarly, in stage 2 the central authority anticipates migration
responses to its transfer choice and takes regional policies as given.
With this arrangement, the vector of decision variables for region i is si = {gi, ti}
while for both regions it is s = {si, sj} where i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The vector, S = {s, ρ},
denotes the decision variables for the whole economy.
The solution to the game is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solved using back-
ward induction. It turns out that to obtain all the information required for the results
we need to solve each stage. However, for the first stage one need only focus on the
problem of region 1, as the solution for region 2 is analogous. Also, there is no need
to provide a formal solution to the sub-game perfect equilibrium as the results can be
obtained without going this far.
Before proceeding, it is useful to set out the regional feasible conditions and the migra-
5See Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015) and in particular pages 27-35 for explanation.
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tion constraint under the above assignment of decision variables. The feasible constraint
for region 1 is
x1n1 + n
α
1 g1 = w1n1 + t1π1 − ρ. (4.1)
Using n2 = (1 − n1) from (2.1), the feasible constraint for region 2, inclusive of the
equalization transfer, can be expressed in terms of n1 as follows,
x2(1− n1) + (1− n1)αg2 = w1(1− n1) + t1π2 + ρ, (4.2)
where π2 = f2(1−n1)−w2(1−n1). From these feasible constraints, an expression can be
derived for per capita private good consumption in each region. This allows the migration
constraint defined at (2.5) to be expressed as{
w1n1 + t1π1 − ρ− nα1 g1
n1
}
+ v1(g1) + a(1− n1) ={
w2(1− n1) + t2π2 + ρ− (1− n1)αg2
1− n1
}
+ v2(g2) + an1
(4.3)
From this constraint, implicitly, n1 is a function of the regional economy’s vector of
decision variables, that is,
n1 = n1(S). (4.4)
Since n2 = 1−n1, then n2 is also, implicitly, a function of the economy’s decision variables;
thus define n2(S). The implication is that the spatial distribution of labor is determined
entirely by regional and central policies.
4.1 Stage 3: Migration equilibrium
The following discussion examines in some detail the migration decision taken by labor
in the final stage. The rationale for doing this is that the conditions for existence and
stability of a migration equilibrium provide restrictions which are important in explaining
the relationship between equalization and rent capture by regions. It is useful to start this
discussion by noticing that once the game between regions and the central authority is
played and their policies, S∗, chosen, labor makes its location choice given these policies,
consistent with the migration constraint. This decision process manifests itself as a
solution, n1(S
∗), to (4.4) which yields the labor supply to region 1 (and hence region 2).
Together, these labor supplies constitute a migration equilibrium.
This raises an issue which is useful for us to explore, namely, under what conditions
will a unique, stable, solution, n∗1(S
∗), and hence n2(S
∗), exist? The answer begins by
observing from the regional and central maximization problems to be developed below
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that the per capita maximum value function for a representative citizen of region i is
Vi(ni) = Max
S∗
ui i = 1, 2. (4.5)
The maximum value function, Vi(ni), yields per capita utility in region i as a function of
ni for a given S













Further, using the approach in Wildasin (1986)7, one can show that xi is strictly
concave in ni. Therefore, over a range of labor supply values from 0 to n
∗
i , where n
∗
i
is the region’s optimal population at which per capita private good consumption and
indirect utility are maximized, we have dxi
dni
> 0. For this range of values for ni the region
is under-populated. At the optimal population, dxi
dni
= 0 and per capita consumption, as
well as indirect utility, are at maximum. When the region’s labor supply exceeds n∗i
we have dxi
dni
< 0 and per capita private good consumption (and hence indirect utility) are
decreasing in ni. For this range of ni values, the region is over-populated in the sense that
its per capita private good consumption and hence indirect utility decrease with more




from (4.6), this also means that µi, the social marginal




(under-population); µi = 0 when
dxi
dni
















< 0 i = 1, 2. (4.7)









i = 1, 2 (4.8)
must also be satisfied.
From Boadway and Flatters (1982), migration equilibria are more likely to be stable in
over-populated federations where dxi
dni
< 0 and hence µi < 0. If this restriction is adopted,
combined with the strict concavity of xi in ni, we are more likely to be assured of the
existence of a unique, stable, migration equilibrium, for given regional and central policies.
6As Milleron (1977) has shown, an envelope condition holds in these models if there is strong com-
plementary between the public and private good. In this case, one can find a maximum for ui at S
∗ by
varying ni to maximize per capita private good consumption, xi.
7See pages 22 to 28 and in particular diagram 3 on page 26 in Wildasin (1986).
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This, in turn, implies from (4.8) that
dµi
dni
< 0 i = 1, 2. (4.9)
Thus, if social marginal benefit in region i is negative and decreasing in ni one is more
likely to have existence of a stable migration equilibrium. As will be shown below, these
existence and stability restrictions are important in helping to determine how equalization
affects regional rent capture efforts, hence their explanation above.
4.2 Stage 2: Inter-regional transfer
In stage 2, the central authority chooses the inter-regional transfer to maximize social


















subject to (4.3) where δ and (1−δ) are the weights for regions 1 and 2 respectively in the
social welfare function. The authority takes regional policies chosen in stage 1 as given
and anticipates the migration response to its choice of transfer. Given this, the first order


















where µ1 and µ2 are the social marginal benefits defined at (3.3). From the migration
constraint, the central authority’s perceived response for labor supply in region 1 to an


























Note that D is negative because stability requires µi < 0 for i = 1, 2. In view of
this, and given that A is positive, ∂n1
∂ρ
is negative. As the central authority increases the
transfer from region 1 to 2, labor migrates in favour of region 2 (and vice versa).
Combining (4.11) and (4.12), the first order condition for the inter-regional equaliza-
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tion transfer, ρ, can be expressed as,
(ρ) : F = µ1 − µ2 − 2a {(1− δ)n1 − δ(1− n1)} = 0. (4.13)
The central authority will choose a value for ρ which satisfies this condition for given
regional rent taxes and local public good provision. Since the authority’s first order
condition for ρ is equivalent to (3.6), one can conclude that the inter-regional equalizing
transfer establishes an efficient migration equilibrium (spatial efficiency) for any given
regional policies.
4.3 Stage 1: Regional rent taxes and public goods









subject to (4.3) while taking the policies of region 2 as given. The first order necessary






+ π1 = 0. (4.15)





. Once signed, these expressions allow one to explain how region
1 chooses the rent tax in the presence of an anticipated equalization transfer. The first
step is to differentiate the migration constraint with respect to t1. After rearrangement,









From the first order condition for the equalization transfer, (4.13), it is also possible to
obtain the equalization transfer response to an increment in the rent tax. The implicit






Obtaining the partial derivatives, Ft1 and Fρ, from the first order condition for the trans-































Note that H is negative because ∂µ1/∂n1 and ∂µ2/∂n2 must each be negative if we are
to be assured of the existence of a stable and unique migration equilibrium (see earlier
discussion of stage 3).








































The restrictions sufficient for existence and stability of a migration equilibrium dis-
cussed earlier are now useful in signing these responses. As discussed in Section 4.1,
existence and stability require that µi < 0 and
∂µi
∂ni
< 0 for i = 1, 2. From the definition of
H at (4.18), ∂µi
∂ni
< 0 implies that H < 0. Moreover, if µi < 0 then D, defined at (4.12), is
negative. This implies that the sign of the labor supply response is unambiguously posi-
tive; that is, ∂n1
∂t1
> 0. Thus, as region 1 increases its rent tax, and hence rent capture, it
attracts mobile labor from the other region.
Even with the restrictions imposed by existence and stability, the sign of the equal-
ization transfer response to an increase in the rent tax is more difficult to determine. It




) in (4.20) is positive or negative. If negative, the
sign of ∂ρ
∂t1




) is positive, then ∂ρ
∂t1
is unambiguously
positive: a higher rent tax in region 1 results in a larger ρ, or transfer from region 1 to 2.




) to be positive. All this requires is that the per
capita rent consumed by a marginal migrant to region 1 is greater than the positive rent




. This, in turn, ensures that per
capita rent is decreasing in labor supply. It is feasible that a migration equilibrium to
stage 1, and a sub-game perfect equilibrium to the game, exists in which this is true.
However, it has not been possible to show that it holds generally, so one must admit the
possibility that it does not8.







increase in rent capture effort by region 1 will increase the equalization transfer it makes
8It can be shown to hold, for example, if region i has a Cobb Douglas production technology for the
numeraire.
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to region 2 by way of the central authority’s decision in stage 2. That is, some of the
additional rent captured by the region will be redistributed (on efficiency grounds) by
the authority to region 2 in the second stage of the game. This has intuitive appeal from
what is well-known about inter-regional transfers needed for spatial efficiency; namely,
they transfer income from high to low rent regions.
The remaining analysis focuses on the case where ∂ρ
∂t1
is positive so that we can see
how the relationship between equalization and rent capture plays out for this case. Now
reconsider the first order condition for t1 at (4.15). Since
∂n1
∂t1




is negative. The larger labor supply induced by a higher rent tax generates
a negative social marginal benefit - a negative externality - which adversely affects all
existing residents of region 1 (per capita indirect utility in the region goes down). This
will be perceived by region 1 as a marginal cost of an increment in the rent tax.
Similarly, if ∂ρ
∂t1
> 0, the impact of a higher rent tax on the equalization transfer will
be seen as a marginal cost of higher rent capture by the region. If the region raises its
rent tax it anticipates that the central authority will increase the equalization transfer in
favour of region 2. As noted, some of the higher rent accruing to region 1 is redistributed
to region 2 to stop inefficient rent seeking migration into region 1.
Hence, region 1 will perceive the migration and equalization responses to its choice
of rent tax to be marginal costs of an incremental increase in the tax. On the other
hand, it perceives π1 to be a marginal benefit. This is the additional rent it reclaims from
foreigners - the tax exporting aspect of its rent tax which was the only variable to figure
in the social planner’s first order condition for the tax.
In view of this, the first order condition for t1 can be re-expressed as an equality
between marginal benefit (on the left side) and marginal cost (on the right side) as
follows:







Recall from the social planner problem that the first order condition for an optimal rent
tax is π1 = 0 with shadow pricing of the fixed input. This holds because the burden of
the tax is fully exported to foreigners making a rent tax of 100 percent optimal. However,
one can see from the above that region 1 will not set a rent tax rate of 100 percent simply
because it perceives there are two locally borne costs associated with rent capture: a
higher equalization transfer to region 2 and a larger labor supply which reduces per
capita indirect utility in region 1.
Therefore, the induced equalisation and migration responses to a change in rent taxes
blunt a region’s incentive to capture local rents by providing a penalty to rent capture





these responses could be a task for further empirical research.
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Notice that if these effects are sufficiently large so that the marginal costs of a higher
tax exceeds the marginal benefit, the tax chosen by region 1 based on (4.21) is zero. The
region 1 may find it optimal not to undertake any rent capture, allowing all regional rents
to flow to foreigners as private income. Another way to think of this is that it is in the
interests of the region not to provide a shadow price for the fixed input, natural resources,
and allow foreign-owned firms to use it for free.
One can proceed here to show that under equalization with anticipation region 1 will
also provide the local public good inefficiently, with over or under provision potential
outcomes. However, this finding is not new - it has already been demonstrated for games
where regions provide local public goods and move first (see, for instance, pages 214-215
of Boadway et al. (2003) as well as Boadway and Tremblay (2010)). Since this is also not
the focus there is no further pursuit of these results here9.
Exactly the same findings apply to region 2 which chooses t2 and g2 to solve a max-
imization problem analogous to (4.21). This region also faces an incentive to choose a
sub-optimal rent tax, including the potential of zero rent capture, because of equalization.
Similarly, region 2 distorts provision of its local public good.
The rationale for this rent under-taxation result is as follows. If any region increases
its effort to capture rents, and hence provide shadow prices for its fixed factors, spatial
efficiency motivates the central authority to respond by redistributing income away from
that region in favour of its neighbors. A regional government contemplating an increase
in rent taxation anticipates this equalization response and perceives it to be a marginal
cost of increasing its rent tax. This reduces its incentives to tax rents and may mean that
a region finds it optimal to levy zero rent tax rates leaving all rents as private income.
As a result of this induced under-taxation, an inter-regional transfer which corrects for
fiscal and rent externalities in order to establish spatial efficiency can no longer establish
a first best outcome.
5 Interpretation and extensions
The analysis and results depend upon a stylized model with simplifying assumptions.
Apart from the standard ones, two require further comment. It was supposed all rents
accrue initially to foreigners so the optimal rent tax rate is 100 percent. Under-taxation
of rents in the policy game was assessed against this benchmark efficiency condition. The
model can be extended to allow local and foreign ownership using share parameters. As
noted, this introduces the complexity of rent tax competition between regions. In this
9This contrasts with Caplan et al. (2000) who find that when regions are first moves and anticipate
the transfer they make efficient voluntary contributions to a national public good.
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world, optimal rent tax rates are less than 100 percent since there is now a marginal cost
to taxing rents: a loss of income to residents who enter the planner’s welfare function.
That said, the optimal tax rate is still non-zero and positive.
The first order conditions for rent taxes in the policy game also become more complex.
However, they still include the two response terms - one for migration and the other for
the transfer - which are the source of distortion to rent taxes. The sign of the transfer
response to changes in rent taxes is also not affected by this extension.
The point is that any attempt by a region to socialize rents, whether they accrue
locally or to foreigners, and disburse them on the basis of residency, is met with the
same response by the central authority in order to achieve spatial efficiency; that is, the
authority will redistribute some share of additional rents socialized by a region to its
neighbors. This insight about rent capture and equalization is true regardless of whether
rents initially accrue to foreigners, local residents or both.
To ensure per capita rent is decreasing in labor supply it was also assumed the rent
consumed by a migrant to a region exceeds the positive rent externality they confer upon
existing residents. If this does not hold, one cannot be sure that equalization causes
the under-taxation of economic rents, though we do know that rent taxes will still be
distorted by equalization, including the possibility of under-taxation. That said, there is
nothing in the mathematics or economics of the model to invalidate this assumption.
Apart from these simplifying assumptions, the result was also obtained for a set of
circumstances in relation to the assignment and timing of decisions. These circumstances
allowed regions to anticipate central policies and distort rent taxes in order to influence
their transfer. There are other combinations of assignment and timing which do not
result in equalisation causing under-taxation of rents. One alternative is as follows. Let
us suppose the transfer, rent taxes and local public good provision are all assigned to the
regions (full decentralisation) and that decision-makers are Nash competitors. It turns
out this is equivalent to the model of Mansoorian and Myers (1993), extended to give
each region a rent tax. One can show that any Nash equilibrium is socially optimal with
efficient transfers and rent capture.10
However, as noted in the paper the assignment of decision variables and timing of
moves adopted in this paper are well-studied in the literature and accord with what is
observed in the practice of equalisation. In this sense, the case identified in this paper
that results in an efficiency problem for equalisation is quite general and the scope of
application for the results reasonably broad.
10This model structure and solution are available from the author as a special request.
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6 Conclusion
What we have learned by allowing rent capture to be modeled as an optimizing decision at
the regional level is that under a plausible set of assignment and timing assumptions the
transfer which corrects for fiscal and rent externalities is no longer unambiguously welfare
enhancing due to the induced under-taxation of rents. In this world, in order to know
whether transfers that correct for migration externalities are welfare enhancing, one needs
to consider how the costs of rent under-taxation offset the gain from achieving spatial
efficiency in welfare terms. Once the potential for under-taxation of rents is recognized,
one should be interested in the net welfare effect of transfers designed to establish spatial
efficiency. This is beyond the scope of this paper, and is left as a problem to be solved by
researchers in the future. The aim in this paper has been to point out that these induced
efficiency costs may exist.
The results in no way invalidate the standard efficiency-in-migration case for inter-
regional transfers. The central authority must still commit to the equalization of fiscal
externalities and economic rents to achieve spatial efficiency based on the well-known ex-
pression. What changes is that now spatial efficiency is achieved at the cost of sub-optimal
local rent capture so it creates an efficiency cost. Also, when the center implements its
inter-regional transfer, the quantum of redistribution needed may depend only upon fiscal
externalities. If local services are highly congested, the amount of income redistributed
across regions to establish spatial efficiency may be small.
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